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We consider the invertibility of a nonparametric nonseparable demand system. Invert-
ibility of demand is important in several contexts, including identi￿cation of demand,
estimation of demand, testing of revealed preference, and economic theory requiring
uniqueness of market clearing prices. We introduce the notion of ￿connected sub-
stitutes￿ and show that this structure is su¢ cient for invertibility. The connected
substitutes conditions require weak substitution between all goods and su¢ cient strict
substitution to necessitate treating them in a single demand system. These conditions
are satis￿ed in many standard models, have transparent economic interpretation, and
allow us to show invertibility without functional form restrictions, smoothness assump-
tions, or strong domain restrictions.
￿This paper combines and expands on selected material ￿rst explored in Gandhi (2008) and Berry and
Haile (2009a). We thank Jean-Marc Robin for helpful discussions. We received useful comments from
participants in the 2011 ￿Econometrics of Demand￿ conference at MIT. Adam Kapor provided capable
research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
We consider the invertibility of a nonparametric nonseparable demand system. Invertibility
of demand is important in several theoretical and applied contexts, including identi￿cation of
demand, estimation of demand systems, testing of revealed preference, and economic theory
exploiting the uniqueness of market clearing prices. We introduce the notion of ￿connected
substitutes￿and show that this structure is su¢ cient for invertibility.
We consider a general setting in which demand for goods 1;:::;J is characterized by
￿ (x) = (￿1 (x);:::;￿J (x)) : X ￿ R
J ! S (1)
where x = (x1;:::;xJ) is a vector of demand shifters associated with each good. All other
arguments of the demand system are held ￿xed. This setup nests a number of special
cases of interest. Points in S may be vectors of quantities demanded, choice probabilities,
market shares, or expenditure shares. The demand shifters x might be prices, unobserved
characteristics of the goods, or latent preference shocks. Several examples below illustrate.
The connected substitutes structure requires two conditions. First, goods must be weak
substitutes in x in the sense that when xj increases (e.g., price falls) only for a subset of
goods j, demand for the remaining goods (taken as a whole) does not increase. Second, there
must be su¢ cient strict substitution among the goods to require treating them all in one
demand system. These conditions are weaker than other notions of substitution (e.g., strict
gross substitutes) and allow us to show invertibility without functional form restrictions,
smoothness assumptions, or domain restrictions relied on previously.
Important to our approach is the explicit treatment of a ￿good 0￿whose ￿demand￿is
de￿ned by the identity




The interpretation will vary with the application. When demand is expressed in shares
(e.g., choice probabilities or market shares), good 0 can be a ￿real￿good￿ e.g., a numeraire
1good, an ￿outside good,￿or a good relative to which utilities are normalized. The identity
(2) will then follow from the fact that shares sum to one. In other applications, good 0 will
be a purely arti￿cial notion introduced only as a technical device (see the examples below).
It is clear from (2) that even when good 0 is a real good, (1) characterizes the full demand
system. Nonetheless, explicitly accounting for the demand for good 0 simpli￿es imposition
of the connected substitutes structure on all goods. When good 0 is an arti￿cial good,
including it in the connected substitutes conditions proves useful as well. As will be clear
below, it strengthens the weak substitution requirement in a natural way while weakening
the requirement of minimal strict substitution.
Invertibility is naturally considered only on the interior of S.1 In some cases, one may
wish to restrict the domain of interest further. For example, one might restrict attention to
values of x observed in a particular data set, or consider only positive prices even when ￿
is de￿ned on RJ (e.g., multinomial logit or probit). Let X ￿ denote the domain of interest,
where
X




￿ ! ￿ (X
￿) (3)
denote the restriction of ￿ to X ￿. Our goal is to provide su¢ cient conditions for invertibility
of ￿￿; i.e., such that for every s 2 int(S) there is at most one x 2 X ￿ satisfying ￿ (x) = s.2
Prior results on invertibility of demand have often relied on conditions that can be dif-
￿cult to motivate and rule out important models of demand for di⁄erentiated products. A
central result is the ￿univalence￿theorem of Gale and Nikaido (1965), which showed global
invertibility of a di⁄erentiable mapping when the domain X ￿ is a rectangle (a product of
intervals) and the Jacobian is everywhere a P￿matrix (i.e., all principal minors are strictly
1In our examples, S is either the unit J-simplex or RJ
+, so int(S) excludes only points in S with zero
demand for some real good. When demand is on a boundary, invertibility will generally fail. For example,
if a good j has zero demand, an increase in its price typically will have no e⁄ect. When ￿ is di⁄erentiable,
a good j with zero demand will typically have
@￿j(x)
@xk = 08k, yielding a singular Jacobian matrix.
2Equivalently, such that for every s 2 ￿ (X ￿) there is a unique x 2 X ￿ satisfying ￿ (x) = s:
2positive). These su¢ cient conditions (see also the variations in, e.g., Garcia and Zangwill
(1979) and Mas-Colell (1979)) can be problematic in applications to demand. Di⁄erentia-
bility is essential, but fails in some important models. Examples include those de￿ned on a
discrete domain (e.g., a grid of prices) or a random utility model with discrete distributions.
Even when di⁄erentiability is assumed, the Jacobian conditions can be di¢ cult to interpret
or to derive from widely applicable primitive conditions (see the examples below). Moreover,
the Jacobian conditions can be problematic when combined with the requirement of a rectan-
gular domain.3 The Jacobian will generally be singular (and, thus, certainly not a P-matrix)
outside the set ~ X (recall footnote 1). Unless ~ X is a rectangle, this limits the applicability
of the Gale-Nikaido result.4 Our connected substitutes conditions avoid these limitations.
Although they rule out some models as well￿ most important, they require either indivisible
goods or the absence of strict gross complements￿ they are easily interpreted, hold in wide
range of models studied in practice, and avoid any smoothness requirement or restriction on
the shape of the set X ￿.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present several examples that motivate
our interest, tie our general formulation to more familiar special cases, and provide further
connections to prior work. In section 3 we set up the model and discuss the connected
substitutes conditions. Our invertibility result is given in section 4. In section 5 we
examine a link between the connected substitutes conditions and the Jacobian condition of
Gale and Nikaido (1965) when demand is di⁄erentiable.
3It is well known that the Gale and Nikaido (1965) result does not generally extend to non-rectangular
domains (e.g., Parthasarathy and Ravindran (2003), Aleksandrov (1994)).
4Consider, for example, a market with vertically di⁄erentiated goods (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978)),
where a lower quality good has no demand unless its price is strictly lower than that of all higher quality
goods. If ￿x is the price vector, the domain of interest X ￿ (e.g., ~ X or the set of observed prices) generally
will not be a rectangle. Other examples in which the natural domain of interest ~ X is nonrectangular include
models of spatial di⁄erentiation (e.g., Salop (1979)) or the ￿pure characteristics￿model of Berry and Pakes
(2007).
32 Examples
Estimation of Discrete Choice Demand Models. A large empirical literature uses
random utility discrete choice models of demand to study di⁄erentiated products markets,
building on pioneering work of McFadden (1974, 1981), Bresnahan (1981, 1987) and others.
Conditional indirect utilities are normalized relative to that of a good 0, often an outside
good representing purchase of goods not explicitly under study.
Much of the recent literature follows Berry (1994) in modeling price endogeneity through a
vector of product-speci￿c unobservables x, with each xj shifting tastes for good j monoton-
ically.5 Holding observables ￿xed, ￿(x)gives the vector of choice probabilities (or market
shares). Typically each ￿j is a nonlinear function of the the entire vector of unobservables
x. Invertibility is therefore nontrivial, and it is critical to estimation approaches, including
those of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Dube, Fox, and Su (2009).6 Berry (1994)
provided su¢ cient conditions for invertibility that include linearity (the conditional indirect
utility for good j is linear in xj), di⁄erentiability of ￿j (x), and strict gross substitutes.7 Our
result relaxes all three conditions, avoiding any functional form restriction or di⁄erentiability
requirement, and imposing the weaker connected substitutes structure.
Note that a discrete choice framework can allow consumers to demand multiple indivisible
goods (including complements), since every bundle can be rede￿ned as a distinct good (e.g.,
5Examples include studies of the US automobile industry (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, 1999,
2004), Petrin (2002)), the European automobile industry (e.g., Verboven (1996), Goldberg and Verboven
(2001)), the breakfast cereal industry (e.g., Nevo (2000), Nevo (2001)), newspapers (e.g., Fan (2008)), movies
(e.g., Davis (2001), Einav (2007)), radio (Berry and Waldfogel (1999)), airlines (e.g., Berry, Carnall, and
Spiller (1996), Berry and Jia (2010)), pharmaceuticals (e.g., Azoulay (2002)), and banking (e.g., Dick (2008)).
6The Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) estimation algorithm also exploits the fact that, in the models
they consider, ￿ (X) = int(S): Given invertibility, this ensures that even at wrong values (i.e., trial values)
of the model parameters, the observed choice probabilities can be inverted. This property is not necessary
for all estimation methods or for other purposes motivating interest in the inverse. However, Gandhi (2010)
provides su¢ cient conditions for a nonparametric model and also discusses a solution algorithm.
7Although Berry (1994) assumes strict gross substitutes, his proof only requires that each inside good
strictly substitute to the outside good. Hotz and Miller (1993) provide an invertibility theorem for a similar
class of models, although they provide a complete proof only for local, not global, invertibility. Berry and
Pakes (2007) state an invertibility result for a discrete choice model relaxing some assumptions in Berry
(1994), while still assuming the linearity of utility in xj. Their proof is incomplete, although adding the
second of our two connected substitutes conditions would correct this de￿ciency.
4Gentzkow (2004)). Thus, the key restriction of a discrete choice setting is the indivisibility
of goods.8 Further, anything that raises the choice probability for good (or bundle) j must
lower the aggregated choice probabilities over all other goods. Thus the restriction to weak
substitutes (Assumption 2 below) is particularly mild in a discrete choice setting.
Nonparametric Identi￿cation of Discrete Choice Demand. Separate from practical
issues of estimation, there has been growing interest in the question of whether discrete choice
demand models in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) are identi￿ed without
the strong functional form and distributional assumptions typically used in applications.
Berry and Haile (2009b, 2010) have recently provided a¢ rmative answers for nonparametric
random utility models in which each consumer￿ s conditional indirect utilities for the ￿inside
goods￿have joint distribution
Fv (vi1t; :::;viJtjcit)
given characteristics cit of the consumer i, the goods j, and the market t. Included in cit
is a vector xt = (x1t;:::;xJt) of unobservables re￿ ecting latent tastes in market t and/or
unobserved characteristics of the goods. By conditioning out all other components of cit,
one obtains nonparametric choice probabilities of the form (1). Berry and Haile (2009b,
2010), relying on the invertibility result below, show that identi￿cation can be obtained
using standard instrumental variables conditions or extensions of classical arguments for
identi￿cation of supply and demand to a system of nonparametric simultaneous equations.
Inverting for Preference Shocks in Continuous Demand Systems. A recent paper
considering invertibility of a nonparametric continuous demand system is Beckert and Blun-
dell (2008). In their model, utility from a bundle of consumption quantities q = (q0;:::;qJ)
8In a recent working paper, Azevedo, White, and Wyl (2011) consider a setting with indivisible goods,
demand for bundles, and a continuum of consumers. They focus on existence of market clearing prices
but also consider uniqueness. They require quasilinear utility and a strong notion of ￿large support￿ for
preferences. Their uniqueness result can be interpreted as demonstrating invertibility of demand (in prices)
under linear pricing of the elementary goods￿ a restriction on X ￿ in our notation. Each of those conditions
would have analogs when x is the vector of product-speci￿c unobservables. Our result requires neither
quasilinearity nor large support, and does not limit attention to a set X ￿ consistent with linear pricing (or,
analogously, linearity of bundle preferences in the product-speci￿c unobservables).
5is given by a strictly increasing C2 function u(q;￿), with ￿ 2 RJ denoting latent demand
shocks. The price of good 0 is normalized to 1 for simplicity. Given total expenditure m
and prices p = (p1;:::;pJ) for the remaining goods, quantities demanded are given by
qj = hj (p;m;￿) j = 1;:::;J
with q0 = m ￿
P
j>0 pjqj.
Beckert and Blundell (2008) consider invertibility of this demand system in the latent
vector ￿, pointing out that this is a necessary step toward identi￿cation of demand or testing
of stochastic revealed preference restrictions (e.g., Block and Marschak (1960), McFadden
and Richter (1971, 1990), Falmagne (1978), McFadden (2004)). They provide several in-
vertibility results. One requires requires marginal rates of substitution between good 0 and
goods j > 0 to be multiplicatively separable in ￿, with an invertible matrix of coe¢ cients.
Alternatively, they provide conditions (on functional form and/or on derivative matrices of
marginal rates of substitution) that imply the Gale-Nikaido Jacobian conditions.
When gross complementarities between goods can be ruled out, we provide alternative
su¢ cient conditions for invertibility that may be more widely applicable. A natural (but
hardly necessary) way to translate their model to ours is through expenditure shares. To
do this, ￿x p and m, let ￿j (￿) = pjh(p;m;￿)=m for j > 0, and relabel x = ￿. Expenditure
shares sum to one, implying the identity (2).
In the Beckert and Blundell (2008) model, the goods j = 0;1;:::;J under study represent
all goods in the economy. A common alternative is to consider demand for a more limited
set of goods￿ for example, goods in a particular product category. In that case, there
will no longer be a good whose demand is determined from the others￿through the budget
constraint. Further, here it is natural to have a demand shock ￿j for every good j. This
situation is also easily accommodated in our framework. Again let x denote the vector
demand shock (￿1;:::;￿J). Holding prices and all other demand shifters ￿xed, let ￿j (x) give
the quantity demand of good j, for j = 1;:::;J. To complete the mapping to our model,
6we let (2) de￿ne the object ￿0 (x). A hint at the role this arti￿cial good 0 plays below can
be seen by observing that a rise in ￿0 (x) represents a fall in the demand for goods j > 0 as
a whole.
Inverting for Prices in Continuous Demand Systems. One could instead investigate
invertibility in prices. Let xj = ￿pj, where pj is the price of good j. Conditional on all other
demand shifters, let ￿j (x) give the quantity of good j demanded for the goods j = 1;:::;J
under consideration. Invertibility of the demand system then implies uniqueness of market
clearing prices, an important property of demand in several contexts. For example, it is
required for Cournot competition to be well de￿ned and, typically, for the derivation of
equilibrium comparative statics. Once again, the result of Gale and Nikaido (1965) has
often been employed to show uniqueness. Cheng (1985) provided more easily interpretable
conditions (and a connection to earlier results on uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium prices,
e.g., Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959)) by showing that the Gale and Nikaido (1965)
Jacobian condition holds under a standard dominant diagonal condition and a restriction
to goods that are strict gross substitutes. The limitations of requiring di⁄erentiability
and a rectangular domain are again a concern.9 Further, the requirement of strict gross
substitutes (here and in several other results cited above) rules out many standard models
of di⁄erentiated products, which feature substitution that is only ￿local￿￿ i.e., between
goods that are adjacent in the product space (see, e.g., Figure 1 and Appendix A below).
Our formulation avoids these limitations, once again using the identity (2) to introduce an
arti￿cial good 0 as a technical device capturing aggregate demand responses.
9The requirement of a rectangular domain is unstated in Cheng (1985), but required by the results relied
on in the proof (in particular, Theorem 20.4 of Nikaido (1968)).
73 Model
3.1 Demand
Let J = f0;1;:::;Jg denote the set of all goods. Recall that x 2 X ￿ RJ is a vector of
demand shifters and that all other determinants of demand are held ￿xed.10 Demand for each
good is given by ￿j (x), j 2 J, where we impose (2). Although we postpone assumptions on
￿ to section 3.2, one should think of xj as a monotonic shifter of demand for good j. In the
examples above, xj is either (minus) the price of good j, the unobserved quality of good j,
or a shock to taste for good j. In all of these examples, monotonicity is a standard property.
Given (2), the demand system can be characterized by ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿J) : X ! S. For
X ￿ ￿ ~ X ￿fx 2 X : ￿ (x) 2 int(S)g, we seek conditions such that for every s 2 int(S) there
is at most one x 2 X ￿ satisfying ￿ (x) = s.
Our ￿rst assumption is a condition on X, the set on which ￿ is de￿ned. This assumption
is required only to ensure that ￿(x) is de￿ned at all x used in our argument. Thus, the
requirement is that X include a su¢ ciently rich set of points. Su¢ cient conditions include X
being open (in the Euclidean topology) or a Cartesian product, the latter allowing a discrete
domain.
Assumption 1. For all distinct x;x0 2 X ￿ and all j such that xj 6= x0
j, there exists ￿j 2 (0;1]














Leading cases satisfying Assumption 1 are when either X or X ￿ is open (take ￿j su¢ -
ciently small) or when either X or X ￿ is a Cartesian product (take ￿j = 1). These cases
may capture most environments of interest.11 Even if this condition fails, it may often hold
10When good 0 is an real good relative to which prices or utilities are normalized, this includes all char-
acteristics of this good. For example, we do not rule out the possibility that good 0 has a price x0, but are
holding it ￿xed (e.g., at 1).
11A more general su¢ cient condition, nesting these and others, is that X ￿ ￿ Y ￿ X, where Y is either
open or a Cartesian product. Examples of other sets satisfying Assumption 1 include the convex cone ￿
x 2 [0;1)J : xj > xj￿1 8j
￿
, the ￿quarter-disk￿ fx : xj ￿ 0 8j, kxk < 1g, and a rectangle with an open
hole, such as
￿




8under an extension of the domain X (e.g., to an open cover) or with a slightly smaller X ￿.
We contrast this assumption with Gale and Nikaido￿ s (1965) requirement of a rectangular
X ￿. Our assumption is much weaker: rectangular X ￿ is a special case of Cartesian X ￿.
Further, our assumption need not place any restriction on the shape or other properties of
the set X ￿ on which invertibility of ￿ is considered. Finally, Assumption 1 plays the role of
a regularity condition for our result, whereas a rectangular domain is integral to the proof
strategy in Gale and Nikaido (1965).
3.2 Connected Substitutes
Our main requirement for invertibility is a pair of conditions characterizing the notion of
connected substitutes. The ￿rst is that the goods are weak substitutes in x in the sense that
when xj increases (e.g., price falls) for only a subset of goods j, demand for the remaining
goods, taken as a whole, does not increase.
Assumption 2. For any I ￿ J and any x;x0 2 X such that x0
j ￿ xj 8j 2 I and x0
j ￿ xj
8j = 2 I,
P
j= 2I ￿j (x0) ￿
P
j= 2I ￿j (x).
Observe than when good 0 is an arti￿cial good, its presence in J adds to the requirements
of Assumption 2 in a natural way. Taking the case where x is (minus) price, all else equal, a
fall in the price of some/all goods j > 0 cannot cause the total demand (over all goods) to
fall.
An alternative notion of weak substitution (that of weak gross substitutes) is that ￿k (x)
is nonincreasing in xj for all k;j 6= k. It is easy to see that this is implied by Assumption
2 (take x0
j ￿ xj, x0
i = xi 8i 6= j; and I = Jnfkg). In many models these conditions are
equivalent￿ for example, when X is a Cartesian product (see Appendix C). In a discrete
choice model, it is easily veri￿ed that both notions of weak substitution are implied by the
standard assumptions that xj is excluded from the conditional indirect utilities of goods
k 6= j and that the conditional indirect utility for good j is increasing in xj.
To state the second condition characterizing connected substitutes, we ￿rst de￿ne a
9directional notion of (strict) substitution.
De￿nition 1. Good j substitutes to good k at x if ￿k (x) is strictly decreasing in xj.
Consider a decline in xj with all else held ￿xed. Assumption 2 implies that this weakly
raises ￿k (x) for all k 6= j. The goods to which j substitutes are those whose demands ￿k (x)
strictly rise. If xj is (minus) the price of good j, this is a standard notion of strict gross
substitution from j to k. De￿nition 1 merely extends this notion to other demand shifters
that may play the role of x. Although this is a directional notion, substitution (as de￿ned
here) is typically symmetric; i.e., j substitutes to k i⁄ k substitutes to j. An exception is
substitution to good 0: since any demand shifters for good 0 are held ￿xed, good 0 does not
substitute to other goods.12
It will be useful to represent substitution among the goods with the directed graph of





1fgood j substitutes to good k at xg j > 0
0 j = 0:
The directed graph of ￿(x) has nodes (vertices) representing each good and a directed edge
from node k to node ‘ whenever good k substitutes to good ‘ at x.
Assumption 3. For all x 2 X ￿, the directed graph of ￿(x) has, from every node k 6= 0, a
directed path to node 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the directed graphs of ￿(x) at generic x 2 X ￿ for some standard
models of di⁄erentiated products, letting x = (￿p1;:::;￿pJ), where pj is the price of good j,
and assuming (as usual) that conditional indirect utilities are strictly decreasing in price. In
all of these models, Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. As panel f illustrates, they hold even when
12If good 0 is a real good designated to normalize utilities or prices, one can imagine expanding x to
include x0 and de￿ning substitution from good 0 to other goods prior to the normalization that ￿xes x0. If
Assumption 3 holds under the original designation of good 0, it will hold for all designations of good 0 as
long as substitution (using the expanded vector x = (x0;:::xJ)) is symmetric at all x 2 ￿￿, a property that
would hold in all the examples below.
10Figure 1: Directed graphs of ￿(x) for x 2 ~ X￿ (x equals minus price) in some standard
models of di⁄erentiated products. Panel a: multinomial logit, multinomial probit, mixed
logit, etc.; Panel b: models of pure vertical di⁄erentiation, (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978),
Bresnahan (1981b), etc.); Panel c: Salop (1979) with random utility for the outside good;
Panel d: Rochet and Stole (2002); Panel e: independent goods with either an outside good
or an arti￿cial good 0.
11J is comprised of independent goods and either an outside good or an arti￿cial good 0. Each
of these examples has an extension to models of discrete/continuous demand (e.g., Novshek
and Sonnenschein (1979), Hanemann (1984), Dubin and McFadden (1984)), multiple discrete
choice (e.g., Hendel (1999), Dube (2004)), and models of di⁄erentiated products demand
(e.g., Deneckere and Rothschild (1992), Perlo⁄ and Salop (1985)) that provide a foundation
for representative consumer models of monopolistic competition (e.g., Spence (1976), Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977)).13
It may be useful to compare the connected substitutes conditions to a strict gross substi-
tutes assumption, where ￿j (x) is strictly decreasing in xk for all k 6= j. The latter obviously
implies Assumption 2, and it further implies that every good j > 0 substitutes to every other
good at all x 2 X ￿￿ a strong su¢ cient condition for Assumption 3. In Figure 1, however,
only the models represented in panel a satisfy the strict gross substitutes condition (see also
Appendix A).
The following lemma provides a helpful interpretation of Assumption 3 and is useful
below.
Lemma 1. Assumption 3 holds i⁄ for all x 2 X ￿ and any nonempty K ￿ Jn0, there exist
k 2 K and ‘ = 2 K such that ￿‘ (x) is strictly decreasing in xk.
Proof. (necessity of Assumption 3) Let I0 (x) ￿ J be comprised of 0 and the indexes of all
other goods whose nodes have a directed path to node 0 in the directed graph of ￿(x). If
Assumption 3 fails, then for some x 2 X ￿ the set K = JnI0 (x) is nonempty. Further, by
construction there is no directed path from any node in K to any node in I0 (x). Thus,
there do not exist k 2 K and ‘ = 2 K such that ￿‘ (x) is strictly decreasing in xk:
(su¢ ciency) Assumption 3 implies that for all x 2 X ￿ and any nonempty K ￿ Jn0, every
13Mosenson and Dror (1972) used a graphical representation to characterize the possible patterns of sub-
sitution for Hicksian demand. Suppose x is minus the price vector, expanded to include the price of good
zero (see footnote 12 ). Suppose further that ￿ is di⁄erentiable and represents the Hicksian (compen-
sated) demand of an individual consumer. Let ￿+ (x) be the expanded subsitution matrix, with elements
￿
+
j+1;k+1 = 1fgood j substitutes to good k at xg: Mosenson and Dror (1972) show that the directed graph
of ￿+ (x) must be strongly connected. This is a su¢ cient condition for Assumption 3.
12node k 2 K has a directed path in ￿(x) to node 0 = 2 K. This is impossible unless there
exist k 2 K and ‘ = 2 K such that good k substitutes to good ‘. ￿
Thus, Assumption 3 requires that there be no way to partition J into subsets of goods
that substitute only among themselves. Note that when good 0 is an arti￿cial good, its
presence in J weakens the requirements of Assumption 3. In particular, taking the case
where x is (minus) price, when the price of some good j > 0 falls, it may be only the
demand for good zero that strictly declines.
Finally, when introducing the model we suggested that xj should be thought of as a
monotonic shifter of demand for good j. The following remark shows that we have implicitly
imposed this monotonicity with the connected substitutes conditions.
Remark 1. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then for all x 2 X ￿ and j > 0, ￿j (x) is
strictly increasing in xj:
Proof. Take x 2 X ￿ and x0 2 X such that x0
j > xj; x0
k = xk 8k 6= j. Assumption 2 implies
￿k (x0) ￿ ￿k (x) 8k 6= j: Further, by Lemma 1, ￿‘ (x0) < ￿‘ (x) for some ‘ 6= j. Thus,
P
k6=j ￿‘ (x0) <
P
k6=j ￿‘ (x). The claim then follows from (2). ￿
4 Invertibility of Demand
We now establish our main result. We begin with a key lemma.14








j2I+ ￿j (x0) >
P
j2I+ ￿j (x):
Proof. Since 0 = 2 I+, Lemma 1 ensures that for some k 2 I+ and some ‘ = 2 I+, ￿‘ (x) is
strictly decreasing in xk. Take one such pair (k;‘). Taking case (a) of Assumption 1, suppose
14If X ￿ is open then, given Assumptions 1 and 2, Assumption 3 is necessary for the conclusion of this
lemma. Suppose Assumption 3 fails. Then by Assumption 2 and Lemma 1 there is some x 2 ￿￿ and some
nonempty K ￿ Jn0, such that ￿‘ (x) is constant in xk for all k 2 K and all ‘ = 2 K. For some ￿ > 0 and each
k 2 K let x0
k = xk + ￿, while x0
j = xj for j = 2 K. Now I+ = K. For su¢ ciently small ￿ we have x0 2 X ￿ and P
j= 2I+ ￿j (x0) =
P
j= 2I+ ￿j (x), which implies
P
j2I+ ￿j (x0) =
P
j2I+ ￿j (x).
13that for some ￿ 2 (0;1] the point ~ x lies in X, where ~ xj = xj + ￿(x0
k ￿ xk)1fj = kg 8j. By
Assumption 2, ￿j (~ x) ￿ ￿j (x) for all j 6= k. Further, ￿‘ (~ x) < ￿‘ (x) by our choice of (k;‘).
So, since ‘ = 2 I+;
X
j= 2I+




Assumption 2 also implies
P
j= 2I+ ￿j (x0) ￿
P











and the result follows from (2). If ~ x = 2 X, so that case (b) of Assumption 1 applies,
instead take k 2 I+ and ‘ = 2 I+ for which ￿‘ (x0) is strictly decreasing in xk (such a pair
being sure to exist by Lemma 1). For some ￿ 2 (0;1], the point ~ x0 must lie in X, where
~ x0
j = x0
j + ￿(xk ￿ x0











and the result follows from (2). ￿
To demonstrate invertibility of demand under the connected substitutes conditions, we
will ￿rst show that ￿￿ (recall 3) is inverse isotone. Below we use ￿ to denote the component-
wise weak partial order on Rn. Thus for y;y0 2 Rn, y ￿ y0 i⁄ yi ￿ y0
i for all i = 1;:::;n:
De￿nition 2. A mapping F : D ￿ Rn ! Rm is inverse isotone if for any y;y0 2 D,
F (y0) ￿ F (y) implies y0 ￿ y:
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1￿ 3, ￿￿ : X ￿ ! S is inverse isotone.























which contradicts (4). ￿
The following remark documents a well known connection between inverse isotone map-
pings and invertible mappings (see, e.g., Rheinboldt (1970)).15
Remark 2. If F : D ￿ Rn ! Rm is inverse isotone, it is injective.
Proof. Suppose F (y) = F (y0) for y;y0 2 D. Since F is inverse isotone this implies both
y ￿ y0 and y0 ￿ y; hence y0 = y: ￿
Given Remark 2, our invertibility result follows as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1￿ 3, for any s 2 int(S) there is at most one x 2 X ￿ such
that ￿ (x) = s.
5 Connected Substitutes and the Jacobian Matrix
It is possible to provide a connection between our connected substitutes conditions and the
global Jacobian condition required by the univalence theorem of Gale and Nikaido (1965).

















Recall that a square matrix is said to be a P-matrix if all its principal minors are positive.
15Another application of Theorem 1 appears in a recent paper by Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2011). They
exploit the inverse isotone property shown here in studying identi￿cation and estimation of multinomial
choice demand models under mismeasurement of market shares.
15Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1￿ 3 hold. Suppose further that for all x 2 X ￿, ￿
is di⁄erentiable and substitution is symmetric between all goods j;k > 0. Then J￿(x) is a
P-matrix for all x 2 X ￿.
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿
One would never use this result to establish invertibility￿ if the connected substitutes
conditions hold, Corollary 1 establishes invertibility without the additional di⁄erentiability
and domain restrictions Gale and Nikaido (1965) require.16 However, Theorem 2 is useful for
understanding the relationship between the two results. Ours avoids the smoothness and
domain restrictions of Gale and Nikaido (1965) while imposing restrictions on substitution
that, given di⁄erentiability and a weak symmetry condition, are su¢ cient for the Gale-
Nikaido Jacobian requirement.
Conditions ensuring that the Jacobian of ￿￿ is a P￿matrix are of independent interest
as well. Berry and Haile (2010) use this result in establishing the identi￿ability of supply
in di⁄erentiated products markets￿ i.e., identi￿cation of marginal costs and of the model
of oligopoly competition. In particular, the P-matrix property ensures invertibility of the
derivative matrix of market shares with respect to prices for goods produced by the same
￿rm￿ a matrix appearing in the ￿rst-order conditions for each ￿rm. Their identi￿cation
results generalize immediately to oligopoly supply models with continuous demand. The
P-matrix property can also be applied instead to the matrix of derivatives of market shares
with respect to the latent demand shocks, which is su¢ cient to ensure a key condition used
in Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) (and con￿rmed there for special cases) to provide the
asymptotic distribution theory for a class of estimators for discrete choice demand models.
In particular, it ensures the Jacobian of demand is always full rank over X ￿.
16Note that Assumption 2 implies that the matrix J￿ (x) is of the ￿Leontie⁄ type.￿ Thus, given the
connected substitutes conditions we used to show that ￿ was inverse isotone in Theorem 1, one could use
Theorem 5 in Gale and Nikado (1965) to show this same property under the additional requirements of
di⁄erentiability and rectangular domain.
166 Conclusion
We have introduced the notion of ￿connected substitutes￿and shown that this structure is
su¢ cient for invertibility in a large class of nonparametric nonseparable demand systems.
The connected substitutes conditions are satis￿ed in a large class of models used in prac-
tice, have transparent economic interpretation, and allow us to show invertibility without
functional form restrictions, smoothness assumptions, or strong domain restrictions. We
have also provided a link between the connected substitutes conditions and the Jacobian
condition required by the classical univalence result of Gale and Nikaido (1965).
17Appendix A. An Example
Here we present a simple variation of Lancaster￿ s (1966) ￿diet example,￿illustrating a contin-
uous demand system with only local substitution, with a non-rectangular domain of interest
, and where the introduction of an arti￿cial good 0 is useful even though an outside good is
already modeled.
A representative consumer has a budget of y and chooses consumption quantities (q1;q2;q3)
of three goods: wine, bread, and cheese, respectively. Her preferences are given by a utility
function
u(q1;q2;q3) = ln(z1) + ln(z2) + ln(z3) + m
where (z1;z2;z3) are consumption of calories, protein, and calcium, and m is money left to
spend on other goods. The mapping of goods consumed to characteristics consumed is given
by17
z1 = q1 + q2 + q3
z2 = q2 + q3
z3 = q3:
We assume y > 3 and that prices (p1;p2;p3) are such that all goods are purchased, i.e.,
0 < p1 < p2 ￿ p1 < p3 ￿ p2: (5)
Since p plays the role of x here, (5) also de￿nes ~ X. ~ X is not a rectangle; however, because
~ X is open Assumption 1 holds for any X ￿ ￿ ~ X (see footnote 11).
17Unlike Lancaster (1966), we sacri￿ce accuracy of nutritional information for the sake of simplicity.
18Figure 2: The directed graph of ￿(x) for the ￿diet example.￿

















for p 2 X ￿. These equations fully characterize demand for all goods. We introduce the
arti￿cial quantity of ￿good 0￿ , de￿ned by




Observe that this arti￿cial good is not the outside good m. Further, the connected substitutes
conditions would not hold if the outside good were treated as good 0:
With (6), (7) implies




From these equations, it is now easily con￿rmed that Assumption 2 holds Further, goods 2
and 3 substitute to each other, goods 1 and 2 substitute to each other, and good 1 substitutes
to good 0. Thus, Assumption 3 also holds. Figure 2 illustrates.
19Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that, under its hypotheses, every principal submatrix of
J￿ (x) is invertible at all x 2 X ￿. We ￿rst review some de￿nitions.
A square matrix is reducible if it can be placed in block upper triangular form by permu-
tations of rows and columns. A square matrix that is not reducible is irreducible. A square





An irreducibly diagonally dominant matrix is a square matrix that is irreducible and diag-






A directed graph G is strongly connected if for every pair of distinct nodes (i;j) in G there
exists a directed path from i to j.
We will rely on the following well known result (see, e.g., Taussky (1949) or Horn and
Johnson (1990), p. 363).
Lemma 3. An irreducibly diagonally dominant matrix is invertible.
For nonempty K ￿ f1;2;:::;Jg, let DK(x) denote the principal submatrix of J￿ (x)
obtained by deleting rows r = 2 K and columns c = 2 K.
Lemma 4. Suppose ￿ is di⁄erentiable on X ￿ and that Assumptions 1￿ 3 hold. Then for all
x 2 X ￿ and nonempty K ￿ f1;2;:::;Jg, DK(x) is diagonally dominant, with at least one
strictly dominant diagonal.
Proof. Take x 2 X ￿. Because
P




@xj = 0. By Assumption 2 and
20Remark 1,
@￿j(x)
@xj > 0 while
@￿k(x)






















￿ ￿ ￿: (9)
which implies ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@￿j (x)
@xj
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
X
k2K￿fjg
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@￿k (x)
@xj
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: (10)
Furthermore, since 0 = 2 K, Lemma 1 implies that for some j 2 K the second sum in (9) is
strictly positive. For that j the inequality (10) must be strict. ￿
The following lemma states a useful elementary result in matrix theory (see, e.g., Horn
and Johnson (1990), p. 362).
Lemma 5. The directed graph of a square matrix A is strongly connected i⁄ A is irreducible.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 2. Take arbitrary x 2 X ￿ and nonempty
K ￿f1;2;:::;Jg. We will show that DK(x) is invertible. First suppose the directed
graph of DK(x) is strongly connected. By Lemmas 4 and 5 it is then an irreducibly diag-
onally dominant matrix and, therefore, invertible by Lemma 3. So suppose instead that
the directed graph of DK(x) is not strongly connected. Since substitution is symmetric on
X ￿, all edges in the directed graph of DK(x) must be bidirectional. Since this graph is not
strongly connected, it must then be possible to partition it into isolated strongly connected
subgraphs, each of which corresponds to a subset of goods that substitute only among them-
selves in K. We can therefore rearrange the order of goods in K, with those in one strongly
connected subset coming ￿rst, another subset following, and so on. The resulting permuta-
tion of DK(x) is block diagonal, with each block being irreducible by Lemma 5. Further, by
Lemma 4, each block is diagonally dominant with at least one strictly dominant diagonal.
Therefore, by Lemma 3, each block is invertible. This implies that the entire DK(x) matrix
is invertible. Since K and x 2 X ￿ were arbitrary, every principal submatrix of J￿ (x) is
invertible for all x 2 X ￿.
21Appendix C
We pointed out in the text that our notion of weak substitution always implies the alternative
notion, that ￿j (x) is weakly decreasing in xk for all k 6= j. The following result provides
one su¢ cient condition for the two notions to be equivalent.
Proposition 1. Suppose X is a Cartesian product and that for all x 2 X, ￿j (x) is weakly
decreasing in xk for all k 6= j. Then Assumption 2 holds.
Proof. Suppose x0
j ￿ xj for all j 2 I, while x0
j ￿ xj for all j = 2 I. Let ~ x be such that ~ xj = xj
for j 2 I and ~ xj = x0
j for j = 2 I. Since X is a Cartesian product, ~ x 2 X. Because ￿j (x) is






















and the result follows. ￿
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